[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
.For he that adds only 4 to 4, and so proceeds, shall as soon come to the end of all addition, as he that adds 400,000,000 to 400,000,000.And so likewise in eternity, he that has an idea of but four years, has as much a positive complete idea of eternity, as he that has one of 400,000,000 of years: for what remains of eternity beyond either of these two numbers of years is as clear to the one as the other; i.e.neither of them has any clear positive idea of it at all.For he that adds only four years to 4, and so on, shall as soon reach eternity, as he that adds 400,000,000 of years, and so on; or, if he please, doubles the increase as often as he will: the remaining abyss being still as far beyond the end of all these progressions, as it is from the length of a day or an hour.For nothing finite bears any proportion to infinite; and therefore our ideas, which are all finite, cannot bear any.Thus it is also in our idea of extension, when we increase it by addition, as well as when we diminish it by division, and would enlarge our thoughts to infinite space.After a few doublings of those ideas of extension, which are the largest we are accustomed to have, we lose the clear distinct idea of that space: it becomes a confusedly great one, with a surplus of still greater; about which, when we would argue or reason, we shall always find ourselves at a loss; confused ideas in our arguings and deductions from that part of them which is confused always leading us into confusion.CHAP.XXX.Of Real and Fantastical Ideas.Real ideas are conformable to their archetypes.§ 1.BESIDES what we have already mentioned concerning ideas, other considerations belong to them, in reference to things from whence they are taken, or which they may be supposed to represent: and thus, I think, they may come under a threefold distinction; and areFirst, either real or fantastical.Secondly, adequate or inadequate.Thirdly, true or false.First, by real ideas, I mean such as have a foundation in nature; such as have a conformity with the real being and existence of things, or with their archetypes.Fantastical or chimerical I call such as have no foundation in nature, nor have any conformity with that reality of being to which they are tacitly referred as to their archetypes.If we examine the several sorts of ideas before-mentioned, we shall find, that,Simple ideas all real.§ 2.First, our simple ideas are all real, all agree to the reality of things, not that they are all of them the images or representations of what does exist; the contrary whereof, in all but the primary qualities of bodies, hath been already shown.But though whiteness and coldness are no more in snow than pain is; yet those ideas of whiteness and coldness, pain, &c.being in us the effects of powers in things without us, ordained by our Maker to produce in us such sensations; they are real ideas in us, whereby we distinguish the qualities that are really in things themselves.For these several appearances being designed to be the mark, whereby we are to know and distinguish things which we have to do with, our ideas do as well serve us to that purpose, and are as real distinguishing characters, whether they be only constant effects, or else exact resemblances of something in the things themselves; the reality lying in that steady correspondence they have with the distinct constitutions of real beings.But whether they answer to those constitutions, as to causes or patterns, it matters not; it suffices that they are constantly produced by them.And thus our simple ideas are all real and true, because they answer and agree to those powers of things which produce them in our minds; that being all that is requisite to make them real, and not fictious at pleasure.For in simple ideas (as has been shown) the mind is wholly confined to the operation of things upon it and can make to itself no simple idea, more than what it has received.Complex ideas are voluntary combinations.§ 3.Though the mind be wholly passive in respect to its simple ideas; yet I think, we may say, it is not so in respect of its complex ideas: for those being combinations of simple ideas put together, and united under one general name; it is plain that the mind of man uses some kind of liberty in forming those complex ideas: how else comes it to pass that one man’s idea of gold, or justice, is different from another’s? but because he has put in or left out of his, some simple idea, which the other has not.The question then is, which of these are real, and which barely imaginary combinations? What collections agree to the reality of things, and what not? And to this I say, That,Mixed modes made of consistent ideas, are real.§ 4.Secondly, mixed modes and relations having no other reality but what they have in the minds of men, there is nothing more required to this kind of ideas to make them real, but that they be so framed, that there be a possibility of existing conformable to them.These ideas themselves, being archetypes, cannot differ from their archetypes, and so cannot be chimerical, unless any one will jumble together in them inconsistent ideas.Indeed, as any of them have the names of a known language assigned to them, by which he that has them in his mind would signify them to others, so bare possibility of existing is not enough; they must have a conformity to the ordinary signification of the name that is given them, that they may not be thought fantastical: as if a man would give the name of justice to that idea, which common use calls liberality.But this fantasticalness relates more to propriety of speech, than reality of ideas: for a man to be undisturbed in danger, sedately to consider what is fittest to be done, and to execute it steadily, is a mixed mode, or a complex idea of an action which may exist
[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]